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ARTICLE
REDEFINING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY STATUTE:
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TENNESSEE




In its 2011 session, the Tennessee General
Assembly purported to overrule a landmark decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court that had clarified the burden of
3production on summary judgment motions. The stage was
set for this legislation by the November 2010 election, in
which Republicans won majorities of twenty to thirteen in
the State Senate and sixty-four to thirty-four (plus one
GOP-leaning independent)4  in the House of
Representatives. In addition, Bill Haslam, the Republican
Mayor of Knoxville, won the election for Governor
*For a transcript of the legislative history of the Bill discussed in this
Article, see the Appendix that begins on Page 206.
1 Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. I wish to thank
my research assistants, Amanda Morse and Mitchell Panter, Class of
2013, for their outstanding research assistance.
2 Assistant Professor, Lincoln Memorial University - Duncan School of
Law. Thank you to my research assistant, Danielle Goins, for her
timely and diligent work.
3 Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).
4 That independent state representative is Kent Williams (I-
Elizabethton), who served as Speaker of the Tennessee House of
Representatives during the 106th General Assembly from 2009 to
2011.
5 Richard Locker, Republican-Led Tennessee Legislature Gets Ready to
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handily, leaving Republicans "large and in charge" and in
control of the executive branch and both houses of the
legislature in Tennessee for the first time since 1869.
Republicans took control of power in Nashville vowing that
they would govern responsibly,7 despite hard feelings
resulting from years of Democratic control,8 not to mention
the surprise, last-minute denial of the Speaker of the House
position to the Republican leader in the 106th General
Assembly.9 The Republican leadership stated at the outset
6 Andy Sher, Tennessee Republicans 'Large and in Charge' of
Legislature, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs FREE PRESS, Feb. 14, 2011,
available at http://timesfreepress.com/news/2011/feb/14/tennessee-
republicans-large-and-in-charge-of/; see also Tom Humphrey, With
Haslam's Election, GOP Power Greatest Since 1869, KNOXVILLE
NEWS SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.knox
news.com/news/201 0/nov/03/with-haslams-election-gop-power-
greatest-since-186/.
7 Andy Sher, Tennessee's First Female State House Speaker, Beth
Harwell, Says GOP Can Shine, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011
/jan/04/harwell-says-gop-can-shine/.
8 See, e.g., Jeff Woods, Republican Majority Members Tout Haslam's
Jobs Agenda as Top Priority; Revenge Might be No. 2, NASHVILLE
CITY PAPER, Dec. 26, 2010, available at http://nashvillecitypaper.com/
content/city-news/republican-majority-members-tout-haslams-jobs-
agenda-top-priority-revenge-might-b.
9 The election of Rep. Williams as Speaker was a bizarre turn of events
that illustrates the fiercely partisan environment of the modern
Tennessee legislature. In the 2008 legislative elections, Tennessee
Republicans had bucked the national Democratic trend and secured a
fifty to forty-nine majority in the House, their first in decades. All fifty
of the GOP legislators, including Williams, signed a pledge to back
Rep. Jason Mumpower (R-Bristol) as Speaker. However, on January
13, 2009, the date of the leadership elections, Williams voted for
himself for Speaker and was elected with the votes of all 49 Democrats,
who had previously agreed to the arrangement. See generally Tom
Humphrey, Williams Elected as House Speaker, KNOXVILLE NEWS
SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.knoxnews.
com/news/2009/jan/14/williams-elected-as-house-speaker/; Andy Sher,
Williams Elected Speaker in Upset; Mumpower Loses, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://
101
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that its top priority at the beginning of the legislative
session was "job creation,"10 and this goal translated into
the passage of a slew of legislative proposals friendly to the
business community, many of which had stalled under the
previous Democratic regime." The most notable of these
was a "tort reform" package that limited non-economic
damages to $750,000, and capped punitive damages at two
times the amount of compensatory damages awarded or
$500,000, whichever is greater.12 While this initiative and
others, such as the abolition of collective bargaining for
teachers, received greater public attention, the new
legislative majority also set its sights on overruling certain
Tennessee Supreme Court decisions that the business
community had interpreted as unfriendly to its interests.13
northgeorgia.timesfreepress.com/news/2009/jan/1 3/williams-elected-
speaker-upset-mumpower-loses/. Then-Speaker Williams was
subsequently stripped of his membership in the Republican party.
Shaila Dewan, Tennessee House Member Wins Top Job, but Loses
Party, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/02/11/us/iltennessee.html. Rep. Williams now
refers to himself as a member of the "Carter County Republican Party."
See TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
house/members/h4.html, (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
10 Sher, supra note 7. Speaker-to-be Harwell's top three priorities at the
outset of the 2011 legislative session were: (1) "job creation . . .
looking forward to supporting Gov. Haslam and what he has in store
for really creating an environment that's conducive for job creation in
this state"; (2) "the budget . . . pass[ing] a balanced budget without
raising taxes"; and (3) "keep[ing the state] moving forward on
education reform." Id.
1 See, e.g., Tom Humphrey, Business Interests had Only Each Other to
Fight, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, June 6, 2011, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/201 1/jun/06/business-interests-only-
had-each-other-to-fight/ ("In many cases, the business lobby found it
could simply sit on the sidelines and cheer for Haslam and the
Legislature's Republican super-majority.").
12 Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 510.
1 Brandon Gee, Turf Battle between Legislature, Judiciary Lies on
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II. Background
In 2008, the Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the federal Celotex summary judgment standard' 4
in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.'5 Some members of the
bench and bar reacted with dismay. Critics claimed that the
Tennessee Supreme Court's requirement that the movant
either "negate an essential element of the nonmovant's
claim" or "show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an
essential element of the claim at trial"' 6 made it
unreasonably difficult for defendants to obtain summary
judgment.17 According to the critics of Hannan, only the
Celotex standard, which permits the movant to carry its
initial burden by demonstrating that the nonmovant lacks
evidence of an essential element of its claim at the
summary judgment stage, is effective in weeding out
nonmeritorious claims prior to trial.' 8
Apparently persuaded by the critics' arguments, the
Tennessee General Assembly, on the last day of the 2011
regular session, May 20, 2011, passed Public Chapter No.
498, which purported to overrule Hannan by adopting the
f-battle-between-legislature-judiciary-lies-horizon-Tenn ("Two bills
that easily passed the General Assembly in 2011 go so far as to tell the
courts how to interpret their own procedural rules for resolving
disputes").
14 Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
270 S.W.3d at 1.
16 Id. at 9.
17 See, e.g., Edward G. Phillips, 'Gossett' Eschews Employers'
Reliance on 'McDonnell Douglas' in Summary Judgment, 47 TENN. B.
J. 24, 25 (Feb. 2011); Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Bye, Bye Byrd?
Summary Judgment After Hannan and Martin: Which Way to Go?, 45
TENN. B. J. 23, 23 (Feb. 2009).
18 See, e.g., Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Bye Bye Hannan? What a
Difference Two Little Words, at Trial, Can Make in the Formulation of




8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 104
Celotex standard for summary judgment. The operative
section of the Act creates a new section of the Tennessee
Code Annotated, which reads as follows:
20-16-101. In motions for summary
judgment in any civil action in Tennessee,
the moving party who does not bear the
burden of proof at trial shall prevail on its
motion for summary judgment if it:
(1) Submits affirmative
evidence that negates an
essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim; or
(2) Demonstrates to the court
that the nonmoving party's
evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element
of the nonmoving party's
claim.' 9
The enacted bill contained findings that expressed the
legislature's purpose to overrule Hannan on the basis of its
conflict with federal law and the unsupported finding that
"this higher Hannan standard results in fewer cases being
resolved by summary judgment in state court, increasing
the litigation costs of litigants in Tennessee state courts and
encouraging forum shopping." 20 The enacted bill also
provided that "[e]xcept as set forth herein, Rule 56 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure remains unchanged." 21
19 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498.
20 Id. at Preamble. One commentator has mistakenly asserted that "[t]he
preamble did not make it into the final version of the law." Blumstein,
supra note 18, at 19 n.14.
21 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498.
104
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III. Celotex in Tennessee: The History behind
Hannan
In 1993, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed
the Celotex trilogy for the first time in Byrd v. Hall -an
opinion that would later be recognized as Tennessee's
"departure from the federal [summary judgment]
standard." 23 Although the Byrd court set out to "establish a
clearer and more coherent summary judgment
jurisprudence," the court's treatment of Celotex was
ambiguous.24 On the one hand, the court "embrace[d]" the
Celotex trilogy;25 however, the court went on to declare that
in Tennessee "[a] conclusory assertion that the nonmoving
party has no evidence is clearly insufficient." 26 Further, the
court held that a moving party in summary judgment may
meet its burden of production in one of two ways: (1) by
"affirmatively negat[ing] an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim," or (2) by "conclusively
establish[ing] an affirmative defense that defeats the
nonmoving party's claim." 27 Thus, despite the Tennessee
Supreme Court's self-professed goal of clarity, the Byrd
decision left many doubts about whether a Celotex-type
motion could succeed in Tennessee.28
Any ambiguity that remained about Tennessee's
embrace of the Celotex standard was erased five years later
22 Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
23 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7.
24 See Blumstein, supra note 18, at 23 (noting Byrd's ""schizophrenic"
approach to Celotex). See generally Judy M. Cornett, The Legacy of
Byrd v. Hall: Gossiping about Summary Judgment in Tennessee, 69
TENN. L. REV. 175 (2001).
25 Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214.
26 Id. at 215.
27 Id. at 215 n.5.
28 See generally Blumstein, supra note 18, at 23. Cf Hannan, 270
S.W.3d at 5 (stating that apparently conflicting statements in Byrd
"have led to some confusion among Tennessee courts as to the proof
required for the moving party to meet its burden of production.").
105
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when the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its decision in
McCarley v. West Quality Food Service.29 In McCarley, the
plaintiff alleged that he became ill after eating Kentucky
Fried Chicken sold by one of the defendant's K.F.C.
franchises. 30 He was diagnosed with food poisoning caused
by campylobacter. During discovery, it was revealed that
the plaintiff had also eaten bacon the morning before
31consuming the allegedly tainted chicken.31 No sample of
either food had been saved. The plaintiffs treating
physician testified that either the chicken or the bacon
could have caused plaintiffs illness, but that the chicken
"was at the top of the list." 32 With the expert testimony in
this state of near-equipoise, the defendant moved for
summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff could not
"carry his burden of proof to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the chicken caused the food poisoning."33
The trial court granted summary judgment, and the court of
appeals, citing Byrd, affirmed.34 The supreme court
reversed, concluding that, although the defendant's
assertions "may cause doubt as to whether the chicken or
the bacon caused [the plaintiff s] illness . . . [t]his evidence,
however, does not negate the chicken from the list of
possible causes." 35 Because the defendant had not negated
an essential element of the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiffs
burden of production was not triggered, and summary
judgment was improperly granted.
In the ten years between McCarley and Hannan, the
Tennessee Supreme Court continued to insist that a movant
must negate an essential element of the nonmovant's claim
29 McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.
1998).




341 Id. at 587-88.
35 McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588.
106
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in order to trigger the nonmovant's burden of production.3 6
Despite this consistent line of decisions over a ten-year
period, the Tennessee bench and bar still occasionally cited
Byrd for the proposition that a movant could carry its
burden of production by demonstrating that the nonmovant
could not prove an essential element of its claim-
essentially, by complying with the Celotex standard.37
Finally, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Hannan
invited the Tennessee Supreme Court to grant permission to
appeal in order to "address (1) the issue of exactly what is
meant by 'negating' an element of a plaintiffs claim, and
(2) whether Tennessee follows the Sixth Circuit's 'put up
or shut up' interpretation of Celotex."3 8
In Hannan, Mr. and Mrs. Hannan owned two
businesses in a small town in East Tennessee: (1) a real
estate company, and (2) a bed and breakfast.39 In 2003, the
plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to advertise their
businesses in the local saffron-colored pages. 40 The
advertisement for the real estate firm, however, was never
published, so the plaintiffs filed an action for lost profits.4'
Interestingly, the plaintiffs' income tax returns actually
revealed an increase in income for 2003.42 Furthermore,
36 See Staples v. CBL & Assoc.,15 S.W.3d 83 (Tenn. 2000); Blair v.
West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004).
37 See Blumstein, supra note 18, at 15 (asserting that "Byrd was .
widely - but by no means universally - read to have articulated a 'put-
up-or-shut-up' standard just like the Celotex standard."). But see Judy
M. Cornett, Trick or Treat? Summary Judgment in Tennessee After
Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 77 TENN. L. REv. 305, 317 n.80
(2010) (demonstrating that in the fifteen-year interval between Byrd
and Hannan, courts rarely misread Byrd as adopting Celotex standard).
38 Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., No. E2006-01353-COA-R3-CV, 2007
WL 208430, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007), aff'd, 270 S.W.3d 1
(Tenn. 2008).
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neither of the plaintiffs could explain the increase in
income, nor could either quantify the lost profits they
alleged they had suffered.43 Accordingly, Alltel moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could
not prove that they suffered lost profits -an essential
element of their claim." The trial court granted summary
judgment for Alltel, but the court of appeals reversed.45
Affirming the court of appeals, the Tennessee
Supreme Court unequivocally rejected Celotex and
reaffirmed a modified version of the Byrd standard. 46
Noting that "[d]ecisions within the federal circuits vary, but
most seem either to follow the [Sixth Circuit's] 'put up or
shut up' approach or to require the moving party merely to
point to deficiencies in the nonmoving party's evidence,"
the court reiterated its departure from the federal
standard.47 The court affirmed the Byrd standard,
modifying the second prong to eliminate any reference to
"conclusively establish[ing] an affirmative defense":
In summary, in Tennessee, a moving party
who seeks to shift the burden of production
to the non-moving party who bears the
burden of proof at trial must either: (1)
affirmatively negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) show
43 Id. at 4. Indeed, during her deposition, Mrs. Hannan was asked, "Do
you have any way of [quantifying in dollars the amount of loss]?" She
replied, "I have absolutely no way of doing that. And neither does
anyone else." Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 4.
" Id. at 3. The Tennessee Supreme Court clarified that the existence of
lost profits was an essential element of the Hannans' claim, while the
amount of any lost profits was a matter for proof at trial, as long as they
could "lay[] a sufficient foundation to allow the trier of fact to make a
fair and reasonable assessment of damages." Id. at 10.
45 Id. at 4-5.
46 Id. at 6.
471 Id. at 5-6.
108
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that the nonmoving party cannot prove an
essential element of the claim at trial.48
Justice William C. Koch, Jr. dissented. Consistent with his
assertion that "[t]he Court's decision in this case brushes
aside fifteen years of post- Byrd v. Hall decisions . . .,'49
the dissenting opinion utilized a vocabulary of
metamorphosis. For example, Justice Koch accused the
majority of "dramatically changing the moving party's
burden of production."50 He declared that movants "will no
longer be able to shift the burden of production" as easily
as they could pre-Hannan.51 He questioned the "change in
direction" supposedly signaled by Hannan.52 Given his
assertion that Hannan changed Tennessee law, Justice
Koch looked to the future: "What practical effect will this
decision have on litigation in Tennessee's courts? The
answer is that its effects will be significant and far-
reaching."53 Finally, Justice Koch made a prediction that
48 Thus, the difference between the Tennessee standard and the federal
Celotex standard is essentially one of timing. The federal standard
permits summary judgment if the non-movant cannot prove an essential
element of its case at the summary judgment stage. The Tennessee
standard permits summary judgment only if the non-movant cannot
prove an essential element of its case at trial. See generally Blumstein,
supra note 18, at 14 (noting importance of two words "at trial");
Cornett, supra note 37, at 334 (noting that in Hannan "the Tennessee
Supreme Court rejected the federal approach to summary judgment as a
way of testing the sufficiency of the nonmovant's evidence pre-trial.").
49 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 17 (Koch, J., dissenting). Justice Koch's
assertion was refuted by the majority, who pointed out that the
interpretation of Rule 56 applied in Hannan is identical to that adopted
in McCarley v. West Quality Food Services, 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.
1998).
5o Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 11 (emphasis added). Accord id. at 17 ("Such
a dramatic change in established summary judgment practice prompts
several questions.")
5i Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
109
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was echoed in later criticism of Hannan and in Public
Chapter No. 498 itself: "The Court's decision will
undermine, rather than enhance, the utility of summary
judgment proceedings as opportunities to weed out
frivolous lawsuits and to avoid the time and expense of
unnecessary trials." 54
Taking their cue from Justice Koch's dissent, some
members of the Tennessee bar, especially the defense bar,
expressed alarm at the Hannan decision.5 5 Indeed, one
prominent Tennessee law firm asserted that "Hannan had
placed such a heavier burden [sic] on parties seeking a
summary judgment that summary judgment was, in effect,
relegated to the spectator seats and no longer a viable
alternative to trial. 5 6 Although the court in Hannan merely
reaffirmed and clarified its fifteen-year-old approach to
summary judgment,5 7 the defense bar, echoing the Hannan
dissent, insisted on viewing Hannan as something new and
different.5 8 Consternation at the decision was undoubtedly
heightened by the bad facts of Hannan, which presented a
worst case scenario in which the plaintiffs admitted that
they lacked proof of the amount of their lost profits -
perceived as an essential element of their claim at the
summary judgment stage. Under Hannan, such plaintiffs
can escape summary judgment and proceed to the trial
54 Id. at 12.
5 See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 18, at 14; Cornett, supra note 37, at
330 n.169, 334 n.196 (citing reactions from the bench and bar).
56 Press Release, Miller & Martin PLLC, Tennessee General Assembly
Changes Standard for Summary Judgment (May 24, 2011) (on file with
author). Although this assertion found its way into the preamble of
Public Chapter No. 498, there has never been any empirical study
supporting a finding that fewer summary judgments were granted after
Hannan than before it, or that summary judgment was granted less
often in Tennessee than in federal court.
5 See Cornett, supra note 37, at 332.
58 E.g., David E. Long, "I Understand TRCP 56": The Evolving
Tennessee Summary Judgment Standard, DICTA (Nov. 2010) at 14.
110
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stage, thereby inducing defendants to settle potentially
nonmeritorious cases.59
Almost two years elapsed between the Hannan
decision and the introduction of the bill that became Public
Chapter No. 498. In the interval came another controversial
court decision deemed unfriendly to business, Gossett v.
Tractor Supply Co.,60 a common-law retaliatory discharge
case in which the Tennessee Supreme Court jettisoned the
McDonnell Douglas61 framework in favor of the general
summary judgment burden-shifting analysis. The Court
noted two main problems with applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage. First,
59 The Hannan case ended in a confidential settlement. See generally
Cornett, supra note 37, at 337 nn.219-20.
6 Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010).
61 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As
described in Gossett, the McDonnell Douglas framework is as
follows:
Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, if an employee
proves a prima facie case of discrimination or
retaliation, the employee creates a rebuttable
presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated or retaliated against him or her. The
burden of production shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory or
nonretaliatory reason for the action. If the employer
satisfies its burden, the presumption of discrimination
or retaliation "drops from the case," which sets the
stage for the factfinder to decide whether the adverse
employment action was discriminatory or retaliatory.
The employee, however, "must ... have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
[employer] were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination." Tennessee courts have
applied this evidentiary framework to statutory
employment discrimination and retaliation claims.
Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 780-81 (citations omitted).
111
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"evidence of a legitimate reason for discharge does not
necessarily show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact" because the articulated reason "is not always mutuall
exclusive of a discriminatory or retaliatory motive ..... "
Thus, the Court implied, the mere articulation of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason should not necessarily
shift the burden of production to the plaintiff. Second,
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once the
defendant articulates its legitimate reason, the
"presumption of discrimination or retaliation" established
by the plaintiff s prima facie case "'drops from the case."' 63
This aspect of the McDonnell Douglas framework means
that "[i]n addressing the issue of pretext, a court may fail to
consider the facts alleged by the employee to show a prima
facie case."6 Indeed, the Court found an example of this
defect in its earlier decision, Allen v. McPhee, which the
Court implicitly overruled in Gossett.66
62 Id. at 782. The common-law tort of retaliatory discharge requires
only that the employee's protected action or inaction be a "substantial
factor" in the employer's decision. Id. at 781.
63 Id. at 780.
6 Id. at 783.
65 Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803 (Tenn. 2007), cited in Gossett,
320 S.W.3d at 783-84.
66 Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 784. Regarding Allen, the Court stated,
"Without the McDonnell Douglas framework, our summary judgment
analysis in Allen would have reached a different outcome. . . . Our
reaffirmation of longstanding Tennessee law on summary judgment ...
convinces us that our application of the McDonnell Douglas framework
in Allen skewed our summary judgment analysis in favor of the
employer." Id. at 784. Although the Court did not explicitly overrule
Allen, most commentators have read Gossett as doing so. Edward G.
Phillips, The Law at Work: "Gossett" Eschews Employers' Reliance on
"McDonnell Douglas" in Summary Judgment, 47 TENN. B.J. 24, 24
(Feb. 2011) ("[T]he upshot of the Gossett majority's criticism of Allen
is that if a plaintiff can establish temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the termination, without more, the plaintiff
prevails at summary judgment."); see also West v. Genuine Parts Co.,
112
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Like Hannan, Gossett caused consternation among
members of the defense bar. The following excerpt is
representative:
In a surprise split decision, the
Tennessee Supreme Court potentially has
made life more expensive for companies
sued by current or former employees for
discrimination.
The 3-2 decision in Gossett v.
Tractor Supply Inc. is a sharp departure
from a decades-long precedent that puts the
burden on employees to prove their firing
was discrimination or retaliation (as opposed
to legitimate reasons) before a case can go to
trial. The Gossett decision forces employers
to do the heavy lifting and prove a worker's
allegation is false.
"The initial reaction from some folks
in our community is this is egregious, Jim
Brown, Tennessee director for the National
Federation of Independent Business, told the
Insurance Journal. "Big businesses will
likely settle, but many small businesses will
likely go out of business. The consequences
of this will be significant." 67
Even the Associated Press report on Gossett misstated its
holding and overstated its implications. According to the
Associated Press, Gossett held "that employers must prove
that workers' claims of discrimination or retaliation are
2011 WL 4356361, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011) (observing that
Gossett "abrogated" Allen).
67 Courtney Rubin, Tennessee Ruling Makes Discrimination Cases
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false or else face a trial."68 Consequently, Gossett "made it
easier for workers to sue their employers." 69 The perceived
extension of Hannan into the employment discrimination
arena, combined with Republican domination of the
General Assembly, set the stage for Public Chapter No.
498.
IV. The Legislative History
In February of 2011, legislation was introduced in
both the House and Senate to overrule Hannan and adopt a
standard for courts to apply at the summary judgment stage
of litigation that purported to more closely match the
federal standard. After House Bill 1358 and Senate Bill
1114 were introduced in their respective chambers in mid-
February, they were referred to their respective Judiciary
Committees. The House version of the summary judgment
legislation, House Bill 1358, was introduced by Rep. Vance
Dennis on February 16, 2011.70 Rep. Dennis is a thirty-
five-year-old Republican from Savannah, in Hardin County
in West Tennessee.7 1 He is a University of Tennessee
College of Law graduate who was first elected to the House
of Representatives in 2008.72 The Senate companion
68 Court Sides with Fired Employees, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL,




69 Id. Accord Pamela Reeves, Certain Firings Made More Difficult,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, October 17, 2010, at C2 ("it will be much
more difficult for employers to get cases dismissed on motions for
summary judgment. . .. "); Phillips, supra note 17, at 25 ("Gossett
largely eviscerates a Tennessee employer's ability to obtain summary
judgment in employment discrimination and retaliation [cases] ....
70 H.B. 1358, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
71 Tennessee General Assembly, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/house/
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legislation, Senate Bill 1114, was introduced by Sen. Brian
Kelsey.73 Sen. Kelsey is a thirty-three-year-old Georgetown
University Law Center graduate, also a Republican, who
has served in both the House and Senate and hails from
Germantown, an affluent Memphis suburb. 74 Rep. Dennis
and Sen. Kelsey sponsored other successful business-
friendly pieces of legislation in 2011, including the tort
reform bill75 and the legislation to overrule Gossett.76
A. The House
The summary judgment legislation sat dormant for
months in both chambers, but moved first in the House
when the Judiciary Subcommittee considered it on April
12, 2011. When asked by Rep. Janis Baird Sontony (D-
Nashville) to explain the legislation, Rep. Dennis stated
7 S.B. 1114, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
74 Tennessee General Assembly, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/senate/
members/S31.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
7 The version of the Civil Justice Act that Rep. Dennis introduced in
the House varied slightly from the version that Gov. Haslam signed
into law in June 2011. Opponents of the bill were successful in adding
an amendment in the Judiciary Committee to remove the damage cap
awards when the tort upon which the defendant is sued results in a
felony conviction of the defendant. Richard Locker, Tennessee House
Panel OKs Limits on Liability: Haslam Says Curbs will Improve Tenn.
Business Prospects, THE COM. APPEAL, Apr. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/201 1/apr/20/house-panel-oks-
limits-on-liability/?partner-RSS. Although Rep. Dennis initially
resisted the amendment, he later vowed to restore the provision
excluding felons from the cap during a future legislative session. Andy
Sher, Lawsuit Caps Legislation Goes to Tennessee Governor,
CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 20, 2011, available at http://
www.timesfreepress.com/news/201 1/may/20/lawsuit-caps-legislation-
goes-tennessee-govemor/ ("Rep. Vance Dennis, R-Savannah, the
House bill's sponsor, said while he disagrees with the Senate version, it
was important to get the bill to Haslam. He said senators have agreed to
work him on separate legislation to restore the House version, although
that will likely to occur next year.").
7 H.B. 1641, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
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that he was "not an expert on it but" would do the best he
could to explain it.77 His explanation as to why it is
necessary to overrule Hannan is somewhat difficult to
understand, but appears to rely upon two assertions that he
and other supporters of the bill repeated throughout the
legislative process: (1) Hannan fundamentally changed the
summary judgment practice in Tennessee from the standard
that existed prior to that case; and (2) the standard in
Tennessee prior to Hannan was the same as the federal
Celotex standard, and it is preferable for Tennessee to
conform to the federal standard.7 8 As discussed,79 the first
of these assertions was made by Justice Koch in his
Hannan dissent and formed the basis for much of the hand-
wringing over Hannan among the business community and
defense bar from late 2008 until 2011. The premise that
Hannan changed, rather than simply clarified, the burden
shifting test on a summary judgment motion is at least
arguable, although likely inaccurate. The second rationale
that Rep. Dennis provides for the legislation - that the
standard for summary judgment in Tennessee that existed
prior to Hannan, under Byrd v. Hall, was the same as the
federal standard - is clearly incorrect. While the standard
n Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 12,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
viewid=186&clipid=41700. Rep. Dennis, who as the sponsor
presumably drafted the legislation, went on to state that he would prefer
"to get somebody that is more fluent on summary judgment practice
and civil practice to explain [the bill] much better than [he] could." Id.
78 "Basically, the gist of [the legislation] is, I think last year or the year
before the Supreme Court made a decision that changed the way the
standard they had historically applied the summary judgment decisions.
And they did it in such a way that it makes it almost impossible for the
court to award summary judgment. . . . [The bill] shifts the standard
from what the court adopted, it shifts it back to what it was prior to that
decision and what it had been in Tennessee for the last, I don't know,
twenty to thirty years, and it mirrors the federal standard for decisions
on summary judgment." Id.
7 Supra, section III.
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the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted in Byrd may not
have been completely transparent, there is no doubt that the
Court declined to adopt the Celotex standard. At any rate,
Rep. Dennis agreed to "roll" - that is, hold over - the bill
until a future meeting of the Judiciary Subcommittee.so
The Subcommittee next considered the bill on April
27, 2011. At this hearing, the rationale for the bill was
challenged by Rep. Karen Camper (D-Memphis), a non-
lawyer whose understandable lack of familiarity with the
highly technical summary judgment process provided Rep.
Dennis with an opportunity to educate the Subcommittee as
to why the bill was necessary. Although Rep. Dennis's
explanation of the summary judgment process to the
Subcommittee was somewhat more cogent than it had been
a couple of weeks earlier, the justification for the bill
remained essentially unchanged: it was necessary to
overrule Hannan because that case changed summary
judgment practice in Tennessee for the worse and because
it would be preferable to return to Celotex, which was the
standard in Tennessee for years under Byrd v. Hall.82 At
80 Statement of Rep. Jim Coley, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr.
12, 2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
viewid=1 86&clip-id=4170.
81 "[T]here is a particular Tennessee Supreme Court case called Hannan
versus Alltel Publishing where the court kind of changed how they look
at and apply Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with
summary judgments and made a really, at least in my opinion, made a
wrong incorrect decision . . . they established a standard that makes it
almost impossible for a court to grant summary judgment . . . . So, it
basically goes back to what the standard was in Tennessee for several
years prior to 2008 when the Supreme Court changed that." Statement
of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27, 2011,
available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=186&
clip-id=4170.
82 "[T]his would go back to the standard that was in place for a number
of years before, under the Byrd case essentially which is a several year
old Tennessee case. This would codify the standard under the Byrd
case and effectively reverse the standard that the Supreme Court put in
place under the Hannan case." Id.
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this hearing, Rep. Dennis came prepared with "a more
skilled quest ... that might can explain [the bill] a little
better" - namely, Benjamin Sanders from Farmers Bureau
Insurance of Tennessee ("Farmers"). The Subcommittee
went out of session and Rep. Dennis called upon Mr.
Sanders to address the Subcommittee directly. 84
Mr. Sanders began his statement to the
Subcommittee with the caveat that, although the summary
judgment bill was not Farmers' bill,8 5 the organization had
83 Id.
" This practice of having lobbyists address the members of the
legislature directly on a pending bill was described by then-Tennessee
Governor Phil Bredesen during a 2007 interview with the Associated
Press. The Governor observed that "[b]ecause lawmakers spend only
part of the year in session and have a limited support staff, they depend
on lobbyists for help developing - and sometimes debating and killing -
complex legislation." Beth Rucker, Ethics Reforms Didn't Take Away
Lobbyists' Power, Bredesen Says, MEMPHIS DALY NEWS, July 31,
2007, available at http://www.memphisdailynews.comleditorial
Article.aspx?id=33447. In this role, "[1]obbyists are often called on
during legislative committee meetings to explain the merits of a bill or
answer lawmakers' questions." Id.
85 Despite this caveat, Rep. Dennis himself privately referred to the bill
as "Farmers' bill" and referred questions about the bill to lobbyists for
Farmers' Insurance. Telephone interview with John Day, Brentwood,
Tennessee (Jan. 23, 2012). In a "State Capital Bulletin" dated May 23,
2011, the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America took
credit for the Hannan legislation: "[I]n the wee hours of the last day of
the legislative session, PCI was successful in amending the summary
judgment law back to the pre-Hannon [sic] decision. This was another
major win for PCI in Tennessee!" Property Casualty Insurers
Association of America, State Capital Bulletin (May 23, 2011). The
Bulletin went on to explain, "The purpose of the bill was to addresses
[sic] the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Hannan v. AlItel Pub where
the Tennessee Supreme Court decision which makes it almost
impossible for a court to grant summary judgment by requiring a party
to essentially prove a negative." Id. (syntax as in original). On its
website, PCI boasts that it has "1000+ members - the broadest cross
section of insurance companies of any national trade group." Property
Casualty Insurers Association of America, http://www.pciaa.net/web/
sitehome.nsf/main (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). Under the tab "Member
118
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"adopted it because it's just such a good idea."86 Mr.
Sanders then explained the need for the legislation in more
detailed, but similar, terms to those that Rep. Dennis had
used:
Summary judgment is a judicial tool that
determines whether a case should go to trial
or not. In other words, if Representative
Dennis sues me than I can challenge under
our old standard of summary judgment... I
can move for summary judgment and
challenge the sufficiency of evidence. And
essentially saying if you don't have enough
evidence to go to trial we need to stop it
right here. Under the old standard, the court
could grant that. They could say, if he
doesn't prove evidence now we're not going
through the time and expense of going to
trial. Under the standard that they adopted in
2008 they changed that. Instead of granting
summary judgment by me challenging his
evidence, they put the burden on the
defendant and said we now have to prove
that he can't prove his case. So, in other
words, if I move for summary judgment
now, under the new standard, all
Representative Dennis has to say is I'll
prove it at trial and doesn't have to show at
that point that he has any evidence. So what
Benefits," PCI makes the following pitch: "The value of joining PCI is
clear from your first day of membership. It starts with having the most
respected, persuasive voice on Capitol Hill and in 50 statehouses
representing you and our industry." Id.
86 Statement of Benjamin Sanders, Farmers' Bureau Insurance of
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we are seeing is a lot cases that have no
disputed facts that are going to trial and that
probably shouldn't go to trial.
This description by Mr. Sanders adds a new justification for
the legislation: the claim that Hannan has led to an increase
in the number of cases that have no disputed issue of
material fact but nevertheless survive summary judgment
and proceed to trial. Mr. Sanders provided no empirical or
even anecdotal proof in support of this assertion, nor did
the Subcommittee hold a hearing to take such evidence.88
Mr. Sanders provided yet another reason for the bill in
response to Rep. Camper's question as to whether the
Tennessee Supreme Court was simply acting within its
rights to interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure when it
decided Hannan. While he conceded to Rep. Camper "that
the Supreme Court certainly had the authority to make a
different interpretation of [Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 56] . . . this bill says it is the public policy of
Tennessee that if you don't have enough evidence to go to
trial for your case that you shouldn't move past the
summary judgment stage." 89 This justification addresses an
important separation of powers concern, because the
legislature generally has the power to articulate public
87 id.
88 The Fiscal Note prepared by the General Assembly's Fiscal Review
Committee on March 1, 2011, estimated the fiscal impact of HB
1358/SB 1114 to be "Not Significant," and assumed that "[c]odifying a
standard for granting summary judgment will have no significant
impact on the case load of trial or appellate courts."
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Fiscal/HB1358.pdf. In fact,
Brentwood trial lawyer John Day has suggested the new legislation
could "cost millions of dollars in attorneys' time to try to figure out
what this law means." Gee, supra note 13.
89 Statement of Benjamin Sanders, Farmers' Bureau Insurance of
Tennessee, to House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27, 2011, available
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policy, whereas reversing the judicial branch's
interpretation of a procedural rule is more questionable.
Unlike Mr. Sanders' earlier rationale regarding the
increased number of cases surviving summary judgment,
however, this legislative purpose was not included in the
legislation.
After Mr. Sanders finished speaking, Rep. Sontany
(D-Nashville) called upon another outside speaker, Doug
Janney of the Tennessee Employment Lawyers'
Association, to speak against the bill.90 Mr. Janney
remarked on what he viewed to be weaknesses in the bill,
focusing in particular on the provision that the party who
does not bear the burden of proof at trial "shall prevail" if it
either affirmatively negates an essential element of the non-
moving party's claim or shows that there is insufficient
evidence to prove an element of the non-moving party's
claim.91 He then engaged in an extended colloquy with
Rep. Dennis on the subject, with Rep. Dennis stating that it
9 Statement of Rep. Sontany, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=41700. According to their website, the Tennessee
Employment Lawyers Association is an "authorized affiliate of the
National Employment Lawyers Association, the largest group of
plaintiff employment lawyers in the country. We are a group of
attorneys dedicated to eradicating employment discrimination in all its
forms from the workplace, and are constantly seeking to influence the
law to better protect workers' rights." The Tennessee Employment
Lawyers Association, https://www.tennela.org/index.php (last visited
Jan. 3, 2012). Unlike Benjamin Sanders, Doug Janney is not a
registered lobbyist.
91 "If [the moving party] submits an affidavit that saying well the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to the courts satisfaction,
than the nonmoving party may not get any opportunity to respond and
have the lawsuit dismissed. And that's inconsistent with summary
judgment practice in federal and in state courts and in the way it's
always been done. You have to give the nonmoving party opportunity
to respond." Statement of Doug Janney to the House Judiciary
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was not the intent of the bill to permit a court to grant
summary judgment without allowing the non-moving party
the opportunity to be heard,92 and Mr. Janney responding
that "it may not be the intent but that's the effect it could
have." 93 Rep. Dennis reminded Mr. Janney that he had
asked him for language to insert into the statute a few
weeks earlier, but had not received any. 94 The back-and-
forth between the two men continued with Mr. Janney
expressing concern that the bill would codify a separate
standard for plaintiffs who move for summary judgment
than for defendants who do so. Finally, Rep. Eric Watson
(R-Cleveland) asked Rep. Dennis if, prior to the bill's
discussion by the full Judiciary Committee, he would meet
with representatives of the trial lawyers' lobby to "just
straighten some of this out" and "[m]aybe . . . write
something different." 95 Rep. Dennis indicated that he was
willing to do so, but that he had already made changes to
the legislation suggested by John Day of the Tennessee
Association for Justice, an organization representing
Tennessee's trial lawyers.96 With this understanding, the
bill was passed through to full committee.
92 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clipjid=4170.
9 Statement of Mr. Janney, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=4170.
94 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id-4170.
95 Statement of Rep. Watson, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clipjid=4170.
96 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=41700. But see Telephone interview with John Day,
supra note 85 (noting that he never suggested specific changes to the
language of the bill but instead questioned the lobbyists for Farmers'
Insurance about the purposes of the bill and merely suggested that those
122
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The full House Judiciary Committee considered HB
1358 on May 3, 2011. Rep. Dennis stressed that the bill
"would codify the court's previous status prior to a
Supreme Court decision in 2008 and take us back to the
way the law was on summary judgment before 2008."" In
fact, he repeated several times in response to questioning
from Rep. Camper that the purpose of the bill was to move
the summary judgment standard "back to what the state
standard was prior to 2008 and what the federal standard
has always been . . . the plaintiff has got to 'put up or shut
up. Following up on the charge he was given at the end
of the Subcommittee's meeting, Rep. Dennis stated that he
had "worked with the trial bar, the Trial Lawyers'
Association, in drafting this language," and it was his
"understanding they don't have any intent to oppose this
bill. Although there was an attorney here last week who
had some issues but he was not representing the Trial Bar
purposes be set forth more clearly). According to its website, the
Tennessee Association for Justice "works to protect the civil justice
system and advocates for accountability and the rights of all citizens."
http://www.tnaj.org/. In the brochure for its 2010 Annual Convention,




97 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Committee, May 3, 2011,
available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=419.
98 Id. Rep. Dennis went so far as to provide an example of a
hypothetical lawsuit in an effort to explain the meaning of summary
judgment and the potential effects of the legislation to Rep. Camper.
Significantly, throughout this hypothetical, Rep. Dennis implied that
the bill would change the burdens of proof, not the burdens of
production, at the summary judgment stage. The implications of this
hypothetical could be misleading in that Hannan dealt only with the
parties' burden of production and the bill was represented as merely
changing the result in Hannan.
123
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Association." 99 With regard to his views on the Hannan
decision, Rep. Dennis stated:
The court got it wrong. The court changed
its standard. The court changed its standard
that it had always applied. The court
changed the standard away from what the
federal courts applied. And we're saying
yes, we do it all the time, that if the court
makes a decision wrong, incorrectly, if the
people think it was done incorrectly, we
change the law to rein that in unless it's a
constitutional issue which has constitutional
protections that are greater than normal. But
yes, the court adopted a standard that was
too far to one side. If we codify this, we will
be bring that standard back in line with what
it was prior to 2008 and what the federal
standard is now.100
During the Judiciary Committee meeting, Rep.
Mike Stewart (D-Nashville) asked Rep. Dennis whether the
legislation might violate separation of powers principles.
He was the only member of either the House or the Senate
to voice this concern that the legislation might violate
separation of powers. Specifically, Rep. Stewart said:
9 Id. Rep. Dennis was apparently referring to Doug Janney of the
Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association. See also Telephone
Interview with John Day, supra note 85 (indicating that the Tennessee
Association for Justice did not actively oppose the bill but also did not
support the bill or express approval of it).
100 Id. When asked by Rep. Mike Stewart (D-Nashville) whether this
bill represented his personal feelings, Rep. Dennis responded that
"there's a lot of concern within the business community that we've
gotten to the point that cases with no merit are getting to juries because
of Hannan - but it is my personal view that we should be using the
Celotex standard, and the Byrd standard, which adopted Celotex."
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I guess my concern is on a rules case, do we
really want to ... you know ... it's different
from creating an environmental law or a law
where a person can carry a gun. That's our
job, we can make that decision, okay. But
I'm worried that this seems like a bad
precedent because the courts ultimately
create these rules. We have a hand in it, but
aren't we really encroaching upon an
independent branch of government? You
know, the reason I say that is if you think
back, you know, where [Franklin]
Roosevelt, a very popular president, ran into
trouble with his own Democrats is when he
tried to pack the Supreme Court and the
Democratic senate said no because they
respected, even though they had respect for
the president, they respected even more this
separate branch of government. Seems to me
what we're doing here . . . I mean if every
time the Supreme Court has said something
about a rule we don't like, if we're going to
start getting in the business of rewriting the
rules every time a case is lost, it seems like
we're stepping into their house and I think
that is not . . . do you really think that's
smart when it comes to rules? I mean rules
about how a court works as opposed to the
underlying policies that the eople sent us
up here to do, to implement.10
101 Statement by Rep. Stewart, House Judiciary Committee, May 3,




8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 126
Rep. Dennis responded that he did not believe the
bill raised constitutional concerns, because the bill neither
changed the language of Rule 56 nor was in direct
contravention to it; rather, the legislation would simply be
establishing a burden of proof, something the General
Assembly had done in many other contexts, both civil and
criminal. 102 To Rep. Dennis, the constitutionality of the
legislation seems to turn on whether the legislature actually
changed the language of the rule itself, although he added
the caveat that if the Supreme Court disagreed, it was their
prerogative to find the bill unconstitutional sometime in the
future. 103 Rep. Stewart responded that he would be voting
against the bill because although the legislation did not
literally change the words of Rule 56, it changed their
meaning, which, to a litigant, was the same thing.104 Rep.
Stewart did vote against the bill, but it passed easily out of
the Judiciary Committee, and then passed the full House,
after no discussion, by an eighty-five to four vote on May
20. 1os
102 Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Judiciary Committee, May 3,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clipjid=419.
103 Id.
i04 Statement by Rep. Stewart, House Judiciary Committee, May 3,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=419. Rep. Stewart added that "[t]he Tennessee Supreme
Court. . . is a pretty pro-business court and I think we should leave it to
the courts to decide what the rules mean." Id.
105 Although there was no discussion on the House floor about HB
1358, there was relevant discussion during the House's consideration of
HB 1641, companion legislation also sponsored by Rep. Dennis that
overruled the Supreme Court's 2010 Gossett decision. During this
debate, Rep. Stewart stated: "I don't think this body should routinely
overturn decisions by our high court whether or not it's to an advantage
of one particular group or another just because I think separation of
powers suggest that we should be very deferential to them." Statement
of Rep. Stewart, House Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=186&clip-id=438.
Rep. Dennis reiterated, "the intent of the legislation is to take us back to
126
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B. The Senate
The legislation's trip through the Senate was even
less eventful than its companion bill's journey through the
House. Only one question was raised when Senate Bill
1114 was brought before the Judiciary Committee on May
17, 106 and it quickly passed out of committee by a six-to-
two vote. Unlike in the House, however, there was some
debate over the bill on the floor of the Senate. Sen. Tim
Barnes (D-Adams), who had raised the lone question in the
Judiciary Committee, stated that the American Association
for Retired Persons ("AARP") was opposing the bill
because it "would make it all but impossible for victims of
employment discrimination or of any other employment
law violation to be able to prove their case and get their
rightful day in court."' 0 7 Sen. Barnes further stated that he
would be voting against the bill because he did not agree
with jettisoning the Tennessee summary judgment standard
the standard that was applied before that case and the standard that is
applied in our federal courts." Statement of Rep. Dennis, House Floor,
May 20, 2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
viewid=186&clip-id=438. Rep. Dennis also opined, in response to
questioning from Rep. Brenda Gilmore (D-Nashville), that the bill
"clarifies" rather than "reverses" the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gossett and makes it no harder for an employee to receive restitution
through an employment discrimination suit. Id.
" The question from Sen. Tim Barnes (D-Adams) was whether the
proposed legislation applies equally to defendants and plaintiffs. See
Statement of Sen. Barnes, Senate Judiciary Committee, May 17, 2011.
Sen. Kelsey clarified that the bill refers not to defendants and plaintiffs,
but "speaks in terms of the party that . . . bears the burden of proof at
trial." Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Judiciary Committee, May 17,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=428.
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in favor of the federal standard."108 Another member, Sen.
Jim Kyle (D-Memphis), expressed concern that the General
Assembly was "blindly overturn[ing] the Supreme Court
decision" in Hannan.'0
Sen. Lowe Finney (D-Jackson) raised specific
concerns that the bill was not sent to the Rules Commission
prior to consideration by the General Assembly.o10 He
asked Sen. Kelsey if he would consider sending the
proposal to the Rules Commission and allowing them to
consider it, as it is generally standard for the courts to
promulgate their own rules of procedure.' Sen. Kelsey
108 Specifically, Sen. Barnes stated that "[s]ummary judgment is
something that is developed in Tennessee with Tennessee body of law,
the law that's unique to Tennessee, and I think it a wrong direction to
go to abrogate Tennessee law and try to impose legislatively a body of
law that is applied in federal courts." Id.
109 Statement by Sen. Kyle, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=43288.
110 Under a statutory procedure in Tennessee, the Supreme Court's
Advisory Commission drafts and vets amendments to the Tennessee
Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure or Rules of Evidence. The
Supreme Court sends them in a package to the General Assembly,
which (unlike the process for the Federal Rules) must approve them by
joint resolution before they have the force of law. See TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -403 (2011). Ironically, during the pendency of
the Hannan legislation, the General Assembly approved amendments to
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. H.R. 0034 (signed by House Speaker May 2, 2011);
S.R. 0012 (signed by Speaker of Senate April 6, 2011).
1n Statement of Sen. Finney, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=186&clip-id=4328
8. Sen. Finney went on to express concern that the Senate had not fully
deliberated over the bill, and stated a preference that "when we start
telling the courts how to expedite dockets, how to get cases moving
along, that we let those rules, that we let those courts decide how to do
it rather than doing it by statute because it's very specialized." Id.
Nashville plaintiff's attorney Mark Chalos recently opined that "[t]he
Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee law is clear that that it is
exclusively in the courts' purview to make rules for resolving disputes.
128
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responded that the bill had been on the Rules Commission
agenda,1 2 and that the Tennessee Bar Association or any
other interested party had ample opportunity to take the
legislation before the Rules Committee after it was
introduced in February, but had not done so. 113 He also
believed that, at any rate, it was unnecessary for the Rules
Committee to consider the legislation because the bill did
not change Rule 56, but rather overruled the Court's
interpretation of it. 114 After this brief debate, the bill passed
the Senate by a nineteen-to-nine vote.
There is a concern that this legislature is ignoring the constitutional
limits on its powers." Gee, supra note 13.
112 In fact, the bill was never on the Commission's agenda and was
never considered by the Commission. See Agenda, Advisory
Commission to the Supreme Court on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Feb. 18, 2011); Minutes, Advisory Commission to the Supreme Court
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 18, 2011); Agenda, Advisory
Commission to the Supreme Court on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(May 13, 2011); Minutes, Advisory Commission to the Supreme Court
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 13, 2011) (on file with
authors).
113 Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=1 86&clipid=
4328. Sen. Finney responded that he served on the Commission and
had the agenda, and the issue was never raised. Statement of Sen.
Finney, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at http://tnga.
granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view id=186&clip-id=43288.
114 "I think the bigger issue is that the rule didn't change. It's been the
rule, it's been there for a number of years. It's the same rule that was in
place before the 2008 decision. It's the same rule in place after the
2008 decision. And it will be the same rule that will be in place after
the passage of this bill. So we're really not looking to change the rule.
We're simply looking to change the law on the burdens of production
and how that is interpreted." Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Floor,
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V. The "Stealth" Bill
The bills that became Public Chapter No. 498,
House Bill 1358 and Senate Bill 1114, were both
introduced on February 16, 2011. The bills were passed by
their respective chambers on May 20, 2011.1s The Senate
then substituted House Bill 1358 for Senate Bill 1114, and
the final bill, House Bill 1358, was signed by the Speaker
of the House on May 24, 2011 and by the Speaker Pro
Tempore of the Senate on May 25, 2011. The legislation
was signed as enacted by Governor Haslam on June 16,
2011.
Between February 16, 2011 and June 16, 2011,
there is not a single mention of either the House or Senate
bill, or the Act as passed, in the media, either legal or
popular. Much media attention was given to the tort reform
legislation that was ultimately passed, but even in this
coverage, the bills attempting to overrule Hannan were not
mentioned.1 6 The "stealth" nature of the Hannan bills may
explain why they were part of the flood of bills-154 in all-
that were passed during the final three days of the
legislative session. 17 Because of the end-of-session rush,
"some [bills] are going to need to be redone in the next
session because they contained mistakes.""1 8
The combination of stealth and rush to passage may
explain the most glaring error in Public Chapter No. 498:
its purported directive that a movant "shall prevail" upon
115 Supra Part IV.
116 This lack of linkage between the tort reform legislation and the
Hannan legislation appears to negate the suggestion made by one
commentator that Public Chapter 498 could be seen as part of the tort
reform package. See Blumstein, supra note 18, at 17.
117 See Lucas L. Johnson II, Tennessee General Assembly Passed 154
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making the specified showing. If read literally, this
language totally changes the current standard for summary
judgment stated in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
56.04:
Subject to the moving party's compliance
with Rule 56.03, the judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. 19
Under Public Chapter No. 498, to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment, the movant need no longer prove that
there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."l 20 Instead, all the movant must do is either
"[s]ubmit[] affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim; or . . .
[d]emonstrate[] to the court that the nonmoving party's
evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim.121
VI. Context and Implications
A. Context
This legislation can be viewed through a few
different lenses. Perhaps the sponsors had a personal belief,
or believed that their constituents would feel, that Hannan
131
" TENN. R. Cv. P. 56.04 (2011).
120 id.
121' 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498.
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was wrongly decided and that it was necessary for the
legislature to step in and require courts adjudicating
summary judgment motions in Tennessee to apply the
Celotex standard. This seems unlikely given the inability of
Rep. Dennis, in particular, to elucidate the precise meaning
and effect of the bill, and his decision to call on Mr.
Sanders from Farmers to describe it to the Judiciary
Committee for him. Another explanation is that the
Republican majorities were determined to pass a business-
friendly agenda during the 2011 session after years in the
political wilderness, and that overturning Hannan was
simply something that their business constituencies wanted
and they had the votes to accomplish. This is a more
reasonable possibility. A third prism looks at the issue more
broadly and tries to place it in context of the ongoing power
struggle between the conservative legislature and the
judicial branch, which the legislature arguably views as the
last check on its complete control of state government. 122
Some of the most significant issues causing this rift
between the legislature and judiciary in Tennessee are: (1)
the method by which Attorney General is selected; (2) the
make-up of the Court of Judiciary; and (3) the Tennessee
Plan, which determines the method of selection of appellate
judges in Tennessee.' 23 Any of these could form the basis
for its own article, but a brief survey of the issues helps to
place the summary judgment legislation in context.
122 Indeed, the attempts of legislatures to extend their power at the
expense of the judiciary have become an epidemic nationwide. See
generally John Gilbeaut, Co-Equal Opportunity: Legislators are Out to
Take Over Their State Judiciary Systems, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 2012),
at 45.
123 For a detailed analysis of the current dynamic in Tennessee
regarding the threat of contested judicial elections - and how Public
Chapter No. 498 contributes to that dynamic - see Judy M. Cornett &
Matthew R. Lyon, Contested Elections as Secret Weapon: Legislative
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i. Appointment of the Attorney General
Tennessee's method of selecting its Attorney
General is unique among the fifty states. Rather than
selecting the office through popular election, or even
through appointment by the Governor, the Attorney
General is appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court for a
term of eight years.124 Some have referred to the Attorney
General, both positivelyl 25 and derogatively,' 26 as the
"fourth branch of government" in Tennessee. Over the past
several years, there have been several attempts, primarily
among conservatives, to amend the Constitution to allow
for popular election of the Attorney General. 127 This
movement gained steam when Tennessee's current
Attorney General, Robert Cooper, declined to join with a
group of other state attorneys general who were challenging
the constitutionality of the federal Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act that passed in 2009.128 Popular
124 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
125 See generally Paul Summers, Attorney General Impartiality is an




126 See Andrea Zelinski, Multiple Proposals Filed to Reform How TN
Picks a Chief Attorney, THE TENNESSEE REP., Jan. 31, 2011, available
at http://www.tnreport.com/201 1/01/multiple-proposals-filed-for-
reforming-how-tn-picks-a-chief-attorney/ (statement by Rep. Joe Carr
(R-Lascassas)).
127 See, e.g., Bonna de la Cruz, 104th General Assembly, THE
TENNESSEAN, January 17, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 26776267;
Proposal Would Add S Office to Statewide Elections, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.wate.
com/story/6324679/proposal-would-add-5-offices-to-statewide-
elections?clienttype=printable&redirected=true; Tennessee Senate
Delays Vote on Plan to Elect Attorney General, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr.
20, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8142261.
128 See, e.g., Mark Todd Engler, Guy to Pressure AG Cooper on
ObamaCare?, THE TENNESSEE REP., Jan. 22, 2011, available at
133
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election of the Attorney General has become a major
priority of the Tennessee Tea Party, and Sen. Brian Kelsey,
the sponsor of the summary judgment legislation, has been
one of the lead proponents.129 Due to the difficulty of
amending the state constitution, an alternative proposal has
been made to create a Solicitor General's office that will
take on many of the functions that the critics of the
Attorney General wish his office would embrace.130
ii. Court of the Judiciary
Established by statute,131 the Court of the Judiciary
investigates allegations of misconduct by Tennessee judges
and imposes discipline. Currently, the Court is made up of
sixteen members: ten judges appointed by the Tennessee
Supreme Court, three members appointed by the Tennessee
Bar Association, and one member each appointed by the
Governor, the House Speaker, and the Senate Speaker Pro
Tempore.132 Recently, the Court of the Judiciary has been
criticized by Republicans for failing to effectively police
the judiciary, with critics pointing to the fact that few
complaints result in discipline, and much of the discipline
http://www.tnreport.com/201 1/01/guv-to-pressure-ag-cooper-to-fight-
obamacare/; Greg Johnson, AG Cooper Should Fight Health Care Law
or Resign, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 2010, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/dec/17/ag-cooper-should-fight-
health-care-law-or-resign/.
129 Andrea Zelinski, Tea Party Wants People's Choice for Top State
Litigator, THE TENNESSEE REP., Jan. 13, 2011, available at
http://www.tnreport.com/201 1/01/tea-party-wants-peoples-choice-for-
to -state-litigator/.
See, e.g., H.B. 1073, 107th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011);
Chas Sisk, Lawmakers Target AG Office, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 26,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 5909301.
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is issued in the form of private reprimands. 133 In response,
a Republican legislator introduced a bill this past session to
shrink membership on the Court of the Judiciary to twelve,
all of them appointed by either the House Speaker or the
Senate Pro Tempore. 134 Although the legislation failed in
the 2011 session, it is an additional example of the tension
between the legislative and judicial branches, and
represents "a fairly straightforward assault on the
independence of the judicial branch."'135 Most recently, an
ad hoc committee of legislators appointed by the House
Speaker and Lieutenant Governor held hearings on the
133 Tom Humphrey, Tennessee Leaders Struggle Over Who Judges the
Judges, KNOXViLLE NEWS SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2011, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/201 1/aug/28/tennessee-leaders-
struggle-over-who-judges-the/; see also Press Release, Tennessee
Senate Republican Caucus, Senator Mae Beavers: Judges Judging




135 Id. An even more straightforward assault on the judiciary was made
by Senator Mae Beavers on January 13, 2012, when she introduced
S.B. 2348, which would have abolished the Tennessee Supreme
Court's power of judicial review of legislation. S.B. 2348, 107m Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (2012) ("The supreme court shall have no
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute which has
been properly enacted by the general assembly and become law in
accordance with Article II, § 18 and Article III, § 18 of the Tennessee
constitution."). See generally Bill Raftery, Tennessee Bill Would End
Judicial Review of All Statutes, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 13, 2012)
available at http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/01/13/tennessee-bill-
would-end-judicial-review-of-all-statutes (noting that bill attempts to
strip judicial review by statute rather than by constitutional amendment
as is being attempted in New Hampshire). Sen. Beavers later withdrew
her bill under pressure from legislators in both parties. Erik Schelzig,
Sen. Mae Beavers Withdraws Bill to Ban Judicial Review, THE






8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 136
Court of the Judiciary, with one lawmaker suggesting that
the legislature do away with the body entirely and have the
members of the judiciary investigated exclusively by
members of the legislature. 36
iii. Tennessee Plan
Probably the greatest source of tension between the
legislature and the judiciary in Tennessee is the constant
threat of revising the method of selecting appellate judges
in Tennessee, known as the Tennessee Plan. The
Tennessee Constitution provides that "[t]he Judges of the
Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified voters of
the State."1 38 In 1993, the legislature enacted the Tennessee
Plan, under which vacancies on appellate courts in
Tennessee are filled by gubernatorial appointment, with
that appointee being called up for a retention vote at the
next biennial election. 139 A number of different proposals
have circulated to change the Tennessee Plan, including
popular election and, most recently, adoption of a system
similar to the federal model (appointment by the Governor
with confirmation by the Senate).140 Most recently,
136 Brandon Gee, Lawmakers Grill Courts' Disciplinary Body, THE
TENNESSEAN, Sept. 21, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 18857433
(statement of Sen. Mike Bell (R-Riceville)). The testimony taken by
legislators at the hearing included John Jay Hooker, a long-time,
outspoken critic of the Tennessee Plan and the Court of the Judiciary,
and individuals "telling tales of judicial misconduct, including that of a
judge who ordered a Hispanic woman to learn English and use birth
control or he would take away her kids." Legislature Aims Scrutiny at
Court of the Judiciary, TENN. ATTORNEYS MEMO, Oct. 3, 2011, at 1.
137 See Cornett & Lyon, supra note 123.
'3 8 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
13 9 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115 (2011).
'4 Sen. Kelsey plans to propose this option in the 2012 legislative
session. Brandon Gee, New Way to Pick TN Judges Proposed, THE
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Governor Bill Haslam, House Speaker Beth Harwell, and
Senate Speaker and Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey have
joined in supporting a constitutional amendment that would
explicitly authorize the Tennessee Plan. 141 Because the
Tennessee Plan expires in 2012, judicial selection is
expected to be a major focus of the 2012 legislative
session.142
B. Implications
This fascinating attempt to legislatively overrule the
Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (or, alternatively, to
legislatively amend Rule 56) raises many questions -
among them, whether the Act violates the separation of
powers provision of the Tennessee Constitution.143 Our
examination of the legislative history reveals a number of
concerns. First, the legislative history provides no support
for any of the legislative findings in the Act. The General
Assembly held no hearings on the legislation. No data was
presented to demonstrate the validity of the assertions that
Hannan had made summary judgment more difficult to
TN-judges-proposed. Proponents of popular elections have suggested
that they might be able to support the plan, id.; however the judiciary
has reacted skeptically, at least initially. Brandon Gee, Nomination
Plan Draws Skepticism Among TN Judges, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 21,
2011, at 4B, available at 2011 WLNR 21625761.
141 Chas Sisk & Brandon Gee, Gov. Bill Haslam Wants TN
Constitutional Amendment on Merit Selection of Judges, THE
TENNESSEAN (Jan. 26, 2012) available at http://www.tennessean.com/
article/20120126/NEWSO201/301250149/Gov-Bill-Haslam-wants-TN-
constitutional-amendment-merit-selection-judges. Gov. Haslam stated
that "the amendment is needed to settle once and for all the long
dispute over how Tennessee's judges are named and elected." Id.
142 Brandon Gee, Nomination Plan Draws Skepticism Among TN
Judges, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 21, 2011, at 4B, available at 2011
WLNR 21625761.
143 See Cornett & Lyon, supra note 123.
137
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obtain and, concomitantly, that the courts were being
overburdened by trials of nonmeritorious cases. Instead, the
reiteration of this unsupported assertion simply echoed the
doom-saying by the defense bar in the wake of Hannan.1"
Principled lawmaking - especially lawmaking that purports
to overrule a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court on a
procedural matter - should be based on more than mere
speculation and doom-saying.
Second, the bills' sponsors provided inaccurate
descriptions of the Tennessee law of summary judgment
both pre- and post-Hannan. The bills' sponsors, both
lawyers, consistently represented to the other legislators,
some of them laypersons, that the bill would return
Tennessee law to its pre-Hannan state, which was identical
to the federal Celotex standard. As shown above, the
assertion that Tennessee summary judgment law was ever
identical to the federal standard is simply wrong. The
erroneous representations about the effect of the bills
served to mislead other legislators, who undoubtedly had
even less of a grasp of the fine points of Tennessee's
summary judgment law than did the lawyer-sponsors.
Exacerbating the sponsors' inability to accurately
depict either the state of Tennessee summary judgment law
or the effect of the proposed legislation is the fact that third
parties had to be called upon to explain the bill. In the
House, Benjamin Sanders, a registered lobbyist for
Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company, who was
apparently standing by, was called upon to "clarify" the
bill, but he also inaccurately described the pre-Hannan
law. 145 Also apparently standing by was Doug Janney,
144 See Phillips, supra n. 17, Blumstein, supra n. 18.
145 Statement of Mr. Sanders, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=
186&clip-id=41700. ("[U]nder our old standard of summary judgment
I can move for summary judgment and challenge the sufficiency of
evidence. And essentially saying if you don't have enough evidence to
138
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President of the Tennessee Employment Lawyers
Association, 146 who accurately pointed out the error
discussed above by noting that the bill "give[s] the
defendant the opportunity to prevail on the motion of
summary judgment without ever giving the plaintiff the
opportunity to respond in some circumstances." 47 While
the legislative history does not reveal the precise role
played by lobbyists in drafting the bill and briefing its
sponsors, the need for third parties to participate in
explaining the bill demonstrates how poorly understood the
bill actually was.
Third, the General Assembly failed to utilize
procedures designed to ensure careful consideration of such
changes to court practice and procedure by not submitting
the bills to the Tennessee Supreme Court Advisory
Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the
"Rules Commission"), as has been customary. In the Senate
debate, Senator Lowe Finney, a member of the Rules
Commission,148 stated, "I think [Senate bill 1114] would be
appropriate for the Rules Commission to look at." When
Senator Kelsey asserted "the Rules Commission already
had a chance to take a look at it last week," Senator Finney
responded, "I have the agenda from the Rules Committee
and it wasn't on the agenda of the Rules Commission
Committee [sic]." Senator Kelsey then replied, "Well the
Tennessee Bar Association had the ability to take it to the
go to trial we need to stop it right here. Under the old standard, the
court could grant that.")
146 See supra, note 90.
147 Statement of Mr. Janney, House Judiciary Subcommittee, Apr. 27,
2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=
186&clip-id=41700.
148 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-601 (2011) (establishing the Advisory
Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure); http://www.
tncourts.gov/boards-commissions/boards-commissions/advisory-
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rules committee and at least somebody on there was aware
of this particular bill and this particular issue." Although it
is unclear why someone from the Tennessee Bar
Association would have known about the bill given the
complete lack of publicity it received, what is obvious from
this colloquy is that the bill's sponsors did not present the
bill to the Rules Commission.149 The General Assembly
thereby lost the opportunity to receive a variety of
perspectives and expert advice about the state of Tennessee
summary judgment law and the potential effect of the bill.
VII. Conclusion
Taken together, these concerns reflect an overall
lack of public attention and significant debate among
legislators. The old canard that "you wouldn't want to
know how the sausage is made" seems to apply here. A
citizen or a court looking to the legislative history to
discover the logic and policy underlying Public Chapter
No. 498 would be frustrated, at best. The oft-repeated
mantra that the bill returns Tennessee law to an edenic state
that existed prior to Hannan is simply wrong; the reports of
decreased grants of summary judgments and increased
numbers of trials post-Hannan is unsupported; and, in
addition to constitutional concerns, the legislature's failure
to follow customary procedures to secure expert advice and
to demonstrate respect for a coordinate branch of
government casts doubt on the wisdom, as well as the
validity, of the legislation.
149 The Commission met twice while the bill was pending. In neither
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